

approval, and deep suspicion that the military action against Iraq was not aimed at liberating the Iraqi people.

Substantial differences did exist between protesters in the eight nations studied despite general similarity between the nations studied (all Western, all highly developed) and other constants (same cause, same call to action, protesting on the same day). In their chapter on the demographics of the protesters, Walgrave, Rucht, and Peter Van Aelst find qualified support for the effect of the government's position on the war and the diversity of the demonstrators, with the least diverse demonstrations occurring in the nations most strongly and clearly in support of the war. While such broad conclusions are possible, explanations of more specific findings, such as the relative youth of demonstrators in Switzerland or high educational level and high predominance of male protesters in Belgium, are too finely grained to be explored in detail.

With each chapter structured to pose and answer specific questions, there are more intriguing findings in this volume than I have space to discuss. I offer the following as one more example of the project at its best. In their chapter on how the protests were framed, Rucht and Joris Verhulst detail how few demonstrators in the two nations leading the charge into war, the United States (8.2 percent) and the United Kingdom (8.4 percent), offered pacifism as a reason to oppose the war, while just over half did so in Italy, and around one-third did so in Spain, Belgium, and the Netherlands. In addition, little evidence was found to support the claim that the rush to war caused an upsurge in anti-Americanism among social activists in Europe (though the Bush administration fared considerably less well).

Distinctive projects require distinctive methodologies and I suspect that this volume will influence how social movement research is done, as well. Using similar—though, perhaps inevitably in such a complex project, not identical—fieldwork methods, research teams interviewed 981 demonstrators and distributed nearly 5800 surveys (46.6 percent of which were returned). To do so, they sampled demonstrators by counting the rows of protesters in a long line of marchers, selecting each n th row, and they every n th protester in that row. Though undoubtedly imperfect, this method allows for the surveying demonstration participants, a rarely utilized method of social movement research. I expect to see it employed frequently in the future.

Not everyone will like the choices made by the editors. Topics that lend themselves to survey research receive much more attention than those

less easily studied in this way. I wanted to see more on how the protests were framed by organizers and how these frames resonated across participants, for example. But others will no doubt revel in the detailed demographic analysis and in the findings on the attitudes of the various demonstrators. This volume deserves wide readership by social movement scholars and will likely become a touchstone for many future discussions of social movement processes.

Rafaela M. Dancygier, *Immigration and Conflict in Europe*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010. \$50.49 (hardcover), \$28.99 (paper).

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With *Immigration and Conflict in Europe* Rafaela Dancygier has entered the culture versus political economy debate squarely on the side of politics and economy. The question is why conflict arises between immigrant groups and natives in post-WWII western democracies and the answer proposed is that the interaction between economic scarcity (defined mainly in terms of housing and, to a lesser degree, other state-provided benefits) and political power (conceptualized in terms of citizenship laws, election rules, and the extent to which immigrants can organize themselves) leads to different types of immigrant related conflict. If the immigrant group in question is able to gain enough political power to gain access to the scarce resources, a native backlash, or immigrant-native conflict, may ensue. If immigrants have little or no political power, they are unable to gain access to resources, thus triggering immigrant-state conflict, wherein immigrants engage in clashes with state actors, mainly police. Cultural explanations for conflict are downplayed here and culture is considered mainly in the form of ethnic and racial identity.

Dancygier begins by describing patterns of immigrant-related conflict in Great Britain from 1950-2008. Then, using a comparative strategy to examine differences in economic scarcity and electoral power, she trains her lens on specific local contexts in Great Britain, with latter chapters considering whether her framework functions similarly in Germany and France. She compares two London boroughs, Tower Hamlets, which has seen ongoing immigrant-native conflict, and Ealing, which experienced immigrant-native conflict

in the 1960s but later came to be considered a model of community relations. Earlier, these two boroughs were similar in that state-owned housing was scarce; but Ealing became less economically deprived than Tower Hamlets. In both locations, however, immigrant communities were able to gain some degree of political power. Thus, Dancygier uses these two boroughs to hold political power relatively constant but varies economic scarcity. That the trajectories of these boroughs differed is seen as evidence of the importance of economic scarcity in explaining conflict.

The cities of Birmingham and Leicester are compared to show how variations in immigrants' local political capital led to different relations between immigrants and natives. In these cases immigrants face similar economic situations but have different levels of political power. In Birmingham, where immigrants were marginalized politically, immigrant-state conflict arose. In Leicester, where immigrants were able to organize to gain resources from the state, immigrant-native conflict occurred.

Dancygier moves on to examine immigrant-related conflicts in Germany and France. Whereas Great Britain has experienced a great deal of both immigrant-native and immigrant-state conflict, Germany has experienced surprisingly little. This is explained in terms of Germany's immigration regime, which was planned carefully in the post-war era. Employers were required to provide housing, while the government tried to keep wages for immigrants relatively high to avoid competition between immigrants and natives. However, in Germany, immigrants have almost no political power (though this is slowly changing). In addition, if immigrant workers become unemployed and use up their unemployment benefits, they are required to leave the country. In France, by contrast, a weakly coordinated immigration regime combines with a relatively liberal citizenship framework to lead to immigrant-related conflict similar to that seen Great Britain.

The moral of the story seems to be that, to avoid conflict, the state must ensure that immigrants are provided for economically (and are forced out of the country when no longer employed), and are denied political power. Dancygier emphasizes the need for states to guarantee some level of economic security to both natives and immigrants.

Because Dancygier situates her study in part in the literature on racial violence and racial conflict, I found myself wishing at times for a more nuanced discussion of the meanings of race and ethnicity in different contexts and over time. I wondered to what extent the clashes described

here would have occurred with alternate configurations of "us" and "them." To what extent is the dividing line simply "we" were here first, while "they" came later? In Germany, significant conflict did not occur with Turkish immigrants, but conflict did occur when people of German ancestry born in other, mostly Eastern European, countries came to Germany after reunification and received special treatment. However, while a more thorough discussion of race, ethnicity, and perhaps culture, might have enriched the analysis, it might also have detracted from this book's elegant and lucid argument.

Creative use of data is one of the strong points of this book, which is meticulously researched and brings to bear on its main questions an impressive range of primary and secondary sources. Dancygier draws on data from government archives, newspaper reports and social surveys, weaving both quantitative and qualitative information into the analysis. In one chapter Dancygier uses the British Citizenship Survey and, in another, records from the Metropolitan Police Service of Greater London, and the UK Audit Commission, which monitors social and economic developments. This is a very well-researched book and it succeeds in the difficult task of organizing a wide array of materials into a clear and readable form.

The main contributions of this study are its attention to within-country variations, its serious effort at pulling apart the main dependent variables of economic scarcity and political power, and its distinction between types of clashes—immigrant-native or immigrant-state. Dancygier has written an excellent book with a strong, testable theoretical framework and strong empirical evidence. It contributes significantly to our understanding of immigrant-related conflict and I suspect Dancygier's framework will be utilized and tested by researchers in the future.

Marco Guigni, (ed.). *The Contentious Politics of Unemployment in Europe: Welfare States and Political Opportunities*. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010. \$85.00 (hardcover).

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The global economic recession that slammed Europe in 2008 fueled an already intense transnational political debate over the entrenched reality of unemployment and the increasingly beleaguered legacy of the national welfare state.